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There seems to be some consensus among academics that for Nietzsche, the untimely polemicist, 
politics were of secondary concern. An apolitical, individualistic thinker who condemned modern 
state nationalism, the human rights tradition, and egalitarian democracy with equal vigor, he 
seems an unlikely resource for political philosophy. Unconventional thinkers, especially those 
who come into wide circulation posthumously, risk having their work appropriated for unin-
tended purposes. Nietzsche’s bellicose rhetoric, aphoristic style and asystematic philosophical 
motifs not only introduce complex hermeneutic problems to the interpretation of his work, but 
also tend to allow a myriad of interpretations, even those that the author clearly con-
demned. Indeed, in the reception of his thought, the question of politics was occasioned by the 
appropriation of his work by the most incredibly destructive and iconoclastic political moment of 
the 20th century. The question of Nietzsche’s politics then, only became widely circulated by 
those interested in defending the philosopher against Nazi interpretations. This is not to say that 
some Nietzschean tropes do not have elitist, eugenic, or delusionally heroic overtones (i.e. species 
perfectionism, the overman) but rather that the importance of these concepts may have been ex-
acerbated by the question of his ties to Nazism. Now that this association has been widely dis-
credited, we may have finally reached a time in which renewed estimations of his political 
thought is possible. The collection Nietzsche and Political Thought, edited by Keith Ansell-Pearson, 
contains a wide variety of assessments and perspectives, and for this reason it is difficult to gen-
eralize the outlook of the text as a whole. It can be said that the text seeks to assess both the status 
of Nietzsche as a political thinker, as well as attempts to establish the relevance of his thought for 
political theory. As each author approaches Nietzsche in light of distinct concerns, I will now turn 
to the individual essays and briefly elaborate their contents. 
Paul Patton argues against the legacy of Nietzsche as an anti-democratic thinker by affirm-
ing him as a species perfectionist. Patton attempts to discern whether or not his ‘grand politics’ is 
incompatible with an egalitarian governing principle. In order to support his view, Patton turns 
to Nietzsche’s account of the origins of justice in capacities for requital, exchange, revenge, and 
gratitude. As a preconception of the will to power, Nietzsche argues that all things seek to express 
or exercise distinct capacities, and that human beings are conscious of and affected by their own 
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actions and the actions of others, leading to a feedback loop of the agent’s action and self-
estimation. Whereas successful actions beget feelings of power, unsuccessful actions lead to feel-
ings of impotence. By establishing the pleasure of gratification as the foundation of human moti-
vation, Nietzsche reduces political concept formation to a single principle. Patton asks “can we 
envision a society in which the affirmation of equal rights of all citizens is a means to the feeling 
of power for individuals and the community as a whole?” (14). In Human, All Too Human, Nie-
tzsche draws a distinction between the government as an organizing power, “nothing but an or-
gan of the people,” and the government as a state that presupposes a hierarchical relationship to 
the governed (16). If it is the case that modern societies lead to pluralism, effective and stable in-
stitutions need to be able to account for “a plurality of conceptions of the good” (17). Patton ar-
gues that Nietzsche is opposed to the protective aspect of the state, but not to democratic self-
determination. His species perfectionism is in line with an egalitarian demand insofar as it re-
quires all people to have access to the resources necessary to cultivate this independence. From 
Patton’s conclusion, we can see that Nietzschean thought can be read democratically insofar as 
democracy is in service of the individual and provides opportunity for the individual to distin-
guish themselves from the mass.  
Rosalyn Diprose aims at recuperating the centrality of truth to politics via honesty and re-
sponsibility, despite Nietzsche’s perspectivism and his attempts to debunk all forms of political 
organization. Nietzsche’s perspectivism and his apolitical orientation may make it seem that he is 
not an ally for a discussion of truth in politics. Diprose’s strategy is to refine precisely which 
forms of truth and falsity Nietzsche affirms and rejects, and for what reasons. Political mendacity 
is noxious; it can destroy the plurality of the public sphere, disorienting individuals in society. 
Diprose argues that Nietzsche understood this well, and developed a political ontology that does 
not rely on distinctions between moral and factual truth. Truth, for him, is more about the neces-
sity of social life rather than the accuracy of expression. Diprose further argues that Nietzsche re-
jected the dishonest mendacity of dogmatism, considered as the willful lying to promote one set 
of values as universal, and instead supports a “politics of expanded responsibility” (32). Revalua-
tion is a future oriented position for Nietzsche, and genuine responsibility involves reintegrating 
the past into an undetermined and open future. While perhaps aggressively individualistic and 
dependent on a heroic conception of political agency, Diprose does well to note the “expansion-
ist” rhetoric surrounding Nietzsche’s discussion of philosophers of the future.  
Peter R. Sedgwick presents the context of two allegations against Nietzsche’s thought: that 
he understands law in a reductive way that focuses on the vacuity of commands, and that he his-
toricizes the origin of the law in a way that undermines any possibility of “discussing ethical con-
tent in the thought of law” (38). In order to answer such criticisms, Sedgwick offers an account of 
Nietzsche’s naturalism that complicates the relationship between the origin of law and the au-
thority of the law. Ultimately Sedgwick argues that Nietzsche’s understanding of the relation of 
authority to law cannot be articulated properly without an account of the dual formation of hu-
man subjectivity and the authority in the law, of lawful command and conformity to law. 
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 Robert Guay positions Nietzsche as a unique political thinker that subscribes neither to 
mass political movements or the politics of direct action, nor to attempts to naturalize politics 
through an ontology of politics, but rather one that relates to politics in primarily diagnostic 
terms. Guay’s Nietzsche is a thinker that is valuable to politics in his ability to draw insights that 
escape the normative features of politics today, demonstrating that how we understand politics in 
the most general sense is actually contingent on a specific historical development in political or-
ganization. Nietzsche argues that movements can become impediments when they take them-
selves as ultimate ends. From this perspective, his understanding and diagnosis of the ‘politics of 
movements’ positions him as a radically anti-democratic thinker. This essay ought to be read in 
contrast to Patton’s treatment of Nietzsche in this same volume. 
David Owen focuses on Nietzsche’s understanding of freedom, arguing that it contains 
three elements, the artistic, the agonic, and the perfectionist. Owen argues that artistic agency is 
expressed in the critical project of revaluation, connecting Nietzsche’s understanding of artistic 
freedom to Kant's account of artistic agency in the Critique of the Power of Judgment. Owen ulti-
mately argues that, for Nietzsche, effective agency requires acknowledging and internalizing 
norms and necessities of the practices through which agency is exercised.  
Herman W. Siemens does not shy away from Nietzsche’s ontological claims, arguing that 
his ontology of antagonism, division, and struggle is a resource to radical democratic political 
theory. While agonistic understandings of politics claim him as an influence, Siemens argues that 
the exegesis of Nietzsche up to this point is incomplete, and that his thought on ontology contains 
corrective potential. Owen focuses on the concept of “agonistic respect” that has come into circu-
lation in the works of radical democratic thinkers, arguing that Nietzsche’s nuanced treatment of 
enmity and hatred as the basis of agonistic tension ought to replace the former. In Owen’s as-
sessment, political dissensus is ineradicable, but desirable: within it is emancipatory potential for 
the future of democracy.  
Alan D. Schrift argues that underlying Nietzsche’s treatment of politics is an attempt to 
work against the Kantian legitimation technique of appealing to transcendent principles. Schrift 
positions Nietzsche in line with Spinoza as a philosopher who uses naturally or immanently 
available concepts in order to ground his claims. In a passage that captures the opposition Schrift 
appeals to, as well as an example of Nietzsche’s ‘politics of immanence,’ Schrift writes, “When 
Nietzsche argues that it is the immanent necessities of social existence required by human beings’ 
entry into community that result in the ‘internalization of man’ that stands at the origin of the 
‘soul’ and the entire inner world, his thinking, like Spinoza’s, challenges the assumption that one 
must ground one’s politics or ethics in something transcendent, be it the Platonic Good, the Chris-
tian God or the Kantian categorical imperative and autonomous moral self” (111). Schrift’s treat-
ment of Nietzsche’s politics remains in a comparative mode, which establishes him as an exem-
plar of immanent politics, but does not move beyond oppositional comparison.  
Gary Shapiro focuses on Nietzsche’s use of the term menge, translated into English as 
“multitude.” Shapiro argues that translators of Nietzsche have not sufficiently differentiated the 
term multitude from similar terms like masses and herds, arguing that he treats the later in an af-
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firmative way. His analysis opens up the possibility of reassessing our understanding of Nie-
tzsche’s affirmation of heterogenous populations. He writes that “the multitude is formed by a 
mixing of races, cultures, ethnicities, and so on,” arguing that Nietzsche affirms the effects of such 
mixing in producing the Greeks (133). Shapiro’s argument provides compelling reasons to distin-
guish Nietzsche’s political thought from the eugenic or xenophobic legacy of naturalistic political 
thinkers that have been associated with it in the history of his reception, connecting it with a tra-
dition of thinkers concerned with the future of politics and the “formation of new cultural config-
urations, and the constitution of a diverse population” (133).  
 Nandita Biswas Mellamphy elaborates an interpretation of Nietzsche through the relation 
of the overhuman to physiology, positioning this reading as “beyond the extent historicist, her-
meneutic and discursive interpretations that seek to resolve, synthesize or idealize contradictory 
tendencies in his thinking” (155). Mellamphy argues that Nietzsche’s materialistic understanding 
of politics does not result in an anthropomorphic understanding of political agency, but rather 
results in assigning the transformative agency generative of political effects to inhuman and ma-
terial forces. Mellamphy further argues that the overhuman is a strategic concept that Nietzsche 
uses to radically rethink the place and fate of human life, replacing anthropocentric political 
thought which he does consider to be vain and absurd. The result is not a binary opposition be-
tween the overhuman and the human, as Mellamphy writes, “the human is a ‘machine’ the mate-
riality of which produces and ‘secretes’ ‘a luxury surplus’ which Nietzsche conceptualizes meta-
phorically in terms of an ‘overman’“(152). Considering the overhuman as transcending the hu-
man, Mellamphy argues, is a mistake, as the former is produced through the latter in Nietzsche’s 
thought. Her work testifies to the importance of not attempting to account for Nietzsche (or, per-
haps for that matter, other unconventional thinkers) in “pre-ordained ideological positions” (154). 
Hermeneuts may wonder, however, how to determine if such an approach is successful, how 
much of the Nietzschean corpus it is meant to apply to, or if it “appears deep” by disguising polit-
ical commitment in the inhuman rhetoric of mechanical processes.1  
Michael Ure focuses on Nietzsche’s philosophy of self-cultivation and investigates how it 
applies to politics. Nietzsche’s appropriation of Hellenistic philosophical therapy has been a hot-
bed for Nietzsche scholarship in recent years, but Ure’s essay is differentiated due to the way he 
focuses on the influence of the line of thought as it manifests in Nietzsche’s later works. Ure does 
not attempt to domesticate his elitism, writing that “Nietzsche’s later bio-political agenda aims 
only at healing those rare higher individuals who have the capacity to elevate the species” (169). 
Ure argues that this bio-political agenda, of “species enhancement” is incompatible with mass 
scale political autonomy, and as such the ‘therapy’ that Nietzsche proposes is intended to cleanse 
“higher types” of “any compassion that might stand in the way” (171). The essay ought to be read 
in conjunction with the developing body of literature surrounding Nietzsche's therapeutic philos-
ophy. 
                                                          
1 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, edited by Bernard Williams, translated by Josefine Nauckhoff. (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), §173, 136. 
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Vanessa Lemm argues against the reception of Nietzsche as a philosopher who favored the 
“aristocratic politics of domination” by interrogating the relationship between ‘great politics’ and 
his conception of “the event” (179). Lemm distinguishes between “small and great politics” in 
Nietzsche’s thought, the former situated within historical time, in which very little happens, and 
the later beyond historical time. Roughly speaking, the division corresponds to a model of history 
in which necessity and human agency produce ‘small events,’ and a model of ‘great politics’ in 
which the “spiritualization” of small events makes these philosophical rather than routinely polit-
ical (193). Lemm argues that ‘great politics,’ understood in this way is not a partial reflection of “a 
whole,” as occurs in “aristocratic domination,” thus distinguishing the aristocratic strain of Nie-
tzsche’s thought from the domain of ‘great politics’ (193).  
Daniel Conway focuses on Nietzsche’s reflexive treatment of morality, his ‘immoralism,’ 
as a moralistic critique that uses the “authority and power of moralism” against morality. This 
overturning of morality, Conway argues, can be used to understand Nietzsche’s connection of the 
overcoming of morality to a coming “tragic age” (211). In this tragic age, Conway argues, “moral 
authority will reside in no one,” as morality “will have exhausted itself as a viable engine of cul-
tural advancement” (212). The self-exhaustion of morality can be ascribed to the work of Nie-
tzsche, “the first immoralist,” who turned the power and authority of morality against itself.  
Bruno Bosteels returns to the work of Pierre Klossowski in light of Alain Badiou’s lectures 
on Nietzsche and antiphilosophy. Bosteels characterizes the connection of these thinkers in the 
following way, “in the conjunction between the value of life, greatness and the need to overturn 
all hitherto existing valuations and types of philosopher there lies the core of what Badiou will 
treat in terms of Nietzsche’s antiphilosophy,” further arguing that what connects the thinkers is 
the “notion of the act or the event” (221). Focusing on his claim to “break the history of humanity 
in two halves,” Bosteels articulates an understanding of Nietzsche’s grand politics “in contrast 
[…] to all other forms of politics” which “no matter how violent or revolutionary, will turn out to 
have been minor, petty or inauthentic” (222). This radical political act signifies Nietzsche’s admit-
tance to the ranks of the antiphilosophers. Bosteels writes “the notion of the act is without a doubt 
the most important element in the formal characterization of any antiphilosophy, namely, the re-
liance on a radical gesture that alone has the force of dismantling, and occasionally overtaking, 
the philosophical category of truth” (225). What Badiou terms the “archipolitical act” in Nie-
tzsche’s thought has the effect of providing the “leverage to reject all actually existing politics, in-
cluding revolutionary politics, as being petty and inauthentic in comparison” (229). This essay, 
like some former essays in the collection, positions Nietzsche’s apolitical orientation as a radical 
rejection of routine politics. 
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